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The analysis so far has shown how global liquidity—boosted by easy money policy 
in advanced economies—has affected emerging markets, particularly in Asia. The 
focus has been on the implications on financial and macroeconomic stability and 
on the behavior of economic agents. It has also pointed to the limited effectiveness 
of standard monetary policy and the need for developing new early warning indica-
tors. From the development perspective, it is also of interest to find out how changing 
global liquidity and capital flows may affect socioeconomic issues such as income 
inequality, unemployment, and poverty. In this chapter, we show in particular how 
capital inflows to emerging Asia can also change these indicators.
Using a general equilibrium framework with a financial module, we show the 
mechanism for how seemingly unrelated financial phenomena are in fact closely 
interlinked with income inequality, unemployment, and poverty. We argue that 
while helping boost economic growth, capital inflow surges can create not only 
financial instability, but also worsen conditions in terms of these socioeconomic 
indicators. More particularly, in the case of increased bank-led flows, the impact 
critically depends on whether or not recipient banks take on more risk. By com-
bining model-based results applied to a particular case in one Asian economy—
where massive capital inflows came in response to easy money and low interest 
rates in advanced economies, and where income disparity is rising—we show that 
when banks become more risky, the impact of increased bank-led flows on growth, 
macroeconomic aggregates, household income distribution, unemployment, and 
poverty are not favorable.
With these results, we then discuss measures that could help prevent banks 
from taking on excessive risk. Using a theory-based ranking and by considering 
the benefits, opportunities, costs, and risks of alternative criteria and policies, 
we find that imposing a macroprudential levy on bank-led flows, the same tool 
we proposed in a previous chapter, can indeed produce more favorable results. 
Furthermore, taking into account several criteria and factors, we argue that this 
policy works not only for macroeconomic and micro-cum-financial stability, but 
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also for socioeconomic objective. This reinforces the argument why a “second 
best” approach to liberalization is better than the “first best” approach. Despite 
the need for cooperation and policy coordination among countries, national pol-
icy should remain key when it comes to maintaining macrofinancial stability and 
improving socioeconomic conditions.
5.1  National Policy Remains Key
Although capital flows derive from push and pull factors—and hence should be ideally 
handled through policy cooperation and coordination among economies—in reality, 
policy makers in individual economies are forced to take unilateral policies. In most 
cases, regional and international policy coordination works only in theory. Indeed, 
even as economies become more interdependent, national policies continue to rule 
irrespective of spillovers to other economies and the talk of policy coordination and 
cooperation. The ultraeasy money policy in advanced economies discussed in Chaps. 2 
and 4 is a recent example of this “financial nationalism.” It had significant repercus-
sions on global liquidity by generating massive capital flows. Despite the risks and 
potential damage capital flows can cause to other economies, no one can stop them—
especially when the spread of returns (interest rates) is large and the growth differential 
between advanced and emerging markets is substantial. In effect, emerging markets at 
the receiving end ought to deal with the risks through unilateral national policies.
If capital inflows cause instability and eventually lead to a crisis, more often 
than not the socioeconomic repercussions are disastrous. In dealing with this, no 
global or regional policy initiative can substitute for good national policies. 
Indeed, the evidence where a standard policy response damages welfare is 
 widespread—especially when governments are belt-tightening. For example, on 
17 May 2012, a joint statement by the Director General of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) and Secretary General of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) said that some 20 million jobs in both 
developed and developing economies had disappeared since the onset of the 
2008/2009 global financial crisis, and 21 million jobs must be generated in G20 
economies just to match the precrisis employment rate—impossible to achieve in 
the near term. If anything, the risk is the unemployment rate could increase. 
A crippled crisis-affected financial sector is bad enough; but nothing is worse than 
if the true costs are in terms of employment and the welfare of most people.1
The national policy most relevant to the phenomenon of capital flows is 
 financial sector liberalization, where capital openness is a central component. 
Financial liberalization has been widely promoted as a way to better allocate capi-
tal and widen opportunities for savers and investors. It creates an environment 
1
 For example, the environmental impact of a contagion-driven crisis poses another serious 
 welfare risk. While a crisis can reduce pollution and resource consumption through reduced 
 economic activity, a weakened economy also tends to lower environmental priorities.
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conducive to financial innovation. Some argue that it also helps build discipline 
among policy makers in securing macroeconomic stability. This has been the 
 predominant thinking for several decades.
One of the most important components—if controversial—of financial sector 
liberalization is capital account liberalization. Capital flows resulting from capital 
account liberalization are channeled through domestic intermediaries—either 
banks or firms—allowing greater competition and thus more efficiency. Countries 
freeing up their capital accounts often see a sudden jump in economic growth as 
they move away from financial repression. Yet, many of them, developing and 
developed economies alike, subsequently face instability, with some eventually 
suffering financial crisis.2
When confronted with this, defenders of capital account liberalization often cite 
the lack of preconditions before liberalizing to explain why crises emerge. They 
blame institutional factors like corruption, weak enforcement, and limited under-
standing on how a liberalized financial sector operates. Policy recommendations 
thus center on fixing those institutional factors; they never question the virtue of 
capital account liberalization itself. But the shocks that hit the US beginning in 
2007 and the later Eurozone crisis are counterevidence that this is based on an erro-
neous hypothesis. The institutional quality in the US and Europe are supposedly 
better than most emerging market economies, yet they could not escape from crisis.
Only recently have analysts and scholars admitted that early preaching on 
financial sector liberalization and capital account liberalization was flawed 
(CIEPR 2012). They now admit that the “first best” approach of financial liber-
alization—where frictionless outcomes are emphasized—is faulty and should be 
replaced by a “second best” approach in which financial regulation is given far 
greater importance, and where capital controls are no longer taboo. After decades 
of preaching the virtues of cross-border capital flows, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) finally admitted that some restrictions on capital flows can help pro-
tect an economy from financial turmoil. Central to the analysis is the need to 
maintain financial stability and macroprudential policy (IMF 2012).
Thus, despite the role of push and pull factors in capital flows, in reality, indi-
vidual economies use unilateral national policies. Capital-sending countries do 
whatever is needed (financial nationalism) regardless of spillover effects on other 
countries. Affected countries also take whatever national policy is necessary to 
assuage the impact. While it provides the rationale for policy coordination, in real-
ity, there is no effective coordination. Although this is nothing new and should not 
seem unusual, the problem becomes serious when a unilateral policy is taken by 
the world’s largest economy, because its policy repercussions will easily spread 
globally through massive capital flows and alter the landscape of global liquidity. 
The resulting exchange rate pressure in emerging markets forced frequent market 
2
 In the 1990s alone, financial crises hit Europe (1992/1993), Mexico/Latin America (1994), 
Asia (1997), Eastern Europe and the Russian Federation (1998). Crisis contagion has also 
become more global and less regional, as evidenced by the recent global financial crisis. New 
technology and better information enable financial spillovers by reducing structural distance.
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intervention to maintain trade competitiveness. Policy makers in emerging markets 
also struggle to minimize the risk of financial instability. As additional funds flow 
in, economic agents take on more risks. Banks are more willing to invest in risky 
financial assets when bank-led flows increase. They are also more willing to lend 
because currency appreciation bolsters borrower balance sheets.
The problem arises when changes in investor sentiment or other external shocks 
cause asset prices to fall and capital flows to reverse. Bank balance sheets will be 
adversely affected, loans disrupted, and the economy can suffer from a credit 
crunch. Some of these were faced by several Asian economies when European 
banks deleveraged and retrenched funds to strengthen their capital position.3 The 
elevated risks in Asia stem from very large amounts of capital flows coming into 
the region, as discussed in Chaps. 2 and 4. The discussions point to one common 
feature: the size and volatility of these flows have increased since the global crisis, 
more than what preceded the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis (Fig. 5.1). As also 
discussed in Chap. 2, among the four types of capital flows, debt- and bank-led 
flows are the most volatile. This poses challenges for financial stability. We discuss 
how this affects welfare next—particularly the income distribution among differ-
ent households in recipient economies.
3
 In the Republic of Korea, each 1 % decline in external funding due to European bank delever-
aging led to a 0.01 % decline in domestic credit by domestic banks (Jain-Chandra et al. 2013). 
This occurred despite the economy’s relatively healthy foreign reserves, government efforts to 
provide foreign currency liquidity through bilateral and multilateral currency swap arrangements, 
and macroprudential measures that lowered domestic bank reliance on short-term wholesale 
funding.
Fig. 5.1  Capital inflows and outflows—selected Asian economies. AFC Asian financial crisis; 
GFC global financial crisis. Note Data include Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, 
and Thailand; based on a 4-quarter moving sum, inflows refers to bank flows from other 
 investments in liabilities (assigned a positive value); outflows are from assets (assigned a negative 
value). Source Processed from Balance of Payments Statistics (both BPM5 and BPM6), International 
Monetary Fund
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5.2  How Capital Flows Affect Income Inequality
To understand better how capital inflows can worsen socioeconomic conditions, 
we need to have a clear conception on how the impact is transmitted, and under 
what conditions inflows will trigger the process. Only then, appropriate policies 
can be identified.4
Figure 5.2 depicts the link between financial development, product and factor 
market, trade, and household income. It is a summarized flowchart explaining the 
transmission mechanism from increased capital flows in the financial market block 
to rising unemployment in the product and factor market block, and worsening 
income inequality and poverty in the household income block.5 The middle part of 
the flowchart represents the dynamics in goods and factor markets (real sector)—
including trade (exports and imports)—while the left side captures the workings of 
financial markets. The interconnection between the two determines the resulting 
unemployment and the generated household incomes in the income block (right 
part of the flowchart). Considering the endogenous prices, the poverty line can 
also be derived endogenously. The nature of the link between financial sector and 
real sector will thus influence income inequality and poverty. But the interrelations 
among variables are complex and nonlinear.
The characteristics of the interrelations among blocks and variables are similar 
to those often captured in a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. To fur-
ther describe the flowchart in Fig. 5.2, the real sector establishes the income genera-
tion from output production, with a portion covering the domestic market and 
exports. Together with imports, those sold in the domestic market generate the 
total supply of goods and services. In both allocations, the substitution is imper-
fect (not costless).6 The process that generates output production follows a stand-
ard input–output framework, where value added and intermediate inputs jointly 
determine the level of output production. Expanding production networks and sup-
ply chains—where the location of production is different from the economy where 
the intermediate inputs are produced—suggests the need to distinguish between 
imported intermediate inputs and domestically produced intermediate inputs. 
This distinction is important particularly for trade analysis in many emerging mar-
ket economies where the import content of many export products is large. The 
dynamics of the use of imported inputs to produce exported goods, known as verti-
cal specialization, reflects a new paradigm in the overall global production network, 
which has increased dramatically since the 1980s, especially in high-tech products 
4
 The analysis in this section is largely taken from Azis (2014).
5
 Not shown in the figure are prices of quantity variables, the role of which is critical in deter-
mining, among others, the endogenous poverty line.
6
 In a standard CGE model, for example, the allocation between the domestic market and 
imports follows Armington’s constant elasticity of substitution, while the allocation between 
domestic market and exports follows a constant elasticity of transformation.
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in emerging Asia (Hummels et al. 2001; Amador and Cabral 2009). It represents an 
important element of international trade.
To focus on the household incomes, we scrutinize the sources of income gener-
ation, both for primary and nonprimary incomes. The primary income is derived 
from the value added, the returns on primary inputs of labor, and capital. In 
turn, these returns generate factor incomes including income from abroad. 
However, total income consists of more than just factor income; it also includes 
transfers between agents/institutions. Tax payments that subtract and subsidies 
that add income are examples of these transfers, where size depends on the pre-
vailing fiscal policy. Thus, income of different agents, including households, is 
influenced by both the level of economic activity and this nonfactor income.7 The 
way subsidies are allocated can have significant impact on actual household 
income; typically, most subsidies go to low-income households.
But to capture the main essence of how capital flows affect household income 
distribution, we need to identify the income generation that originates in the financial 
sector. This is important because in reality the actual income received by the rich and 
urban-based households holding financial assets can be well above income accrued 
7
 The effect of income level on macro variables works through the expenditure side. Together 
with government expenditure and net exports, real consumption reflects the size of agents’ 












































































































Fig. 5.2  Flowchart connecting real financial sector and income distribution. Source Modified 
from Azis (2014)
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by those who do not hold financial assets. Thus, even if factor incomes and transfers 
tend to be more equalized, earnings from these financial assets can worsen overall 
income inequality.
In a liberalized financial and capital account environment, rich urban-based house-
holds are better able to reap benefits from an expanding financial sector. During the 
“bubble” period following a surge in capital inflows, they benefit from the increased 
value of their financial assets as well as the income stream generated from those 
assets, regardless of what happens in the real economy. In many cases, this portion is 
larger than that generated from factor income. To the extent the financial sector often 
grows much faster than the real sector during a boom, the impact on income distri-
bution can be predicted—the rich earn far more than the poor, and urban household 
income grows faster than rural income. Both of these exacerbate income inequality.
The increase in bank-led flows discussed in Chaps. 2 and 4 is first charted in 
capital flows at the bottom left of Fig. 5.2. Together with bank loans, these flows 
directly augment banks’ financial liabilities.8 This alters the rate of return on 
financial assets and financial returns received by asset holders (financial returns 
and income are linked). Financial assets also have a two-way relationship with the 
size and composition of different agents’ assets. Fixed assets will be used directly 
for real sector investment, such as in buildings, machinery, and the like, while the 
rest—including financial assets—may move indirectly via financial markets; for 
example, funds from equity issuance are used for business investment. Along with 
government spending, consumption expenditure, exports, and imports, this real 
investment generates real gross domestic product (GDP).9
When there is an increase in capital flows, also captured by increased foreign 
savings, the exchange rate tends to appreciate. This is on top of the macrofi-
nancial impact of the flows. The resulting trade account may thus worsen due 
to falling exports and increased imports. In reality, however, almost all emerg-
ing market economies with large capital inflows respond by imposing some sort of 
capital controls—either directly (through taxes or levies, for example) or indirectly 
(sterilized market intervention). This explains why net exports in some countries 
continue to grow despite increased capital inflows. When net exports shrink, the 
growth of consumption and investment can also offset the decline.
The resulting higher real gross domestic product fuels further financial sector 
growth either from strong fundamentals or simply market expectations. This fur-
ther enhances rich household income along with savings or wealth, providing 
them with an additional income stream from financial returns. Note that changes 
in the exchange rate also cause some valuation effects: The local currency value of 
any assets denominated in foreign currencies will increase (decrease) when local 
currency appreciates (depreciates). If, through the portfolio allocation, the 
increased wealth is reinvested in financial instruments with lucrative returns, the 
8
 As discussed in Chap. 4, lending is not only determined by the size of a bank’s available funds, 
but also by changes in net worth and external finance premiums of both borrowers and lenders.
9
 Other financial variables can also affect aggregate economic activity through the money 
market.
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financial assets and earnings of rich households increase yet again. This magnitude 
of the growth–inequality nexus is amplified through this feedback cycle.10
Thus, through this mechanism, we strongly argue that—in addition to standard 
factors like technology, globalization, education, and domestic institutions—the 
trend of rising inequality can be exacerbated by the noninclusive nature of finan-
cial sector growth.
To verify the above hypothesis, we use a financial computable general equilib-
rium (FCGE) model for one emerging Asian economy. Indonesia is selected for 
the following reasons. Like most emerging markets, the country’s financial sector 
has been growing rapidly since financial liberalization began in the 1980s, and 
capital inflows after the global financial crisis also rose significantly. At the same 
time, Indonesia’s income inequality has worsened. The model is the evolution of 
the original FCGE developed since late 1990s (Azis 1997). After several modifica-
tions and advancements, a more detailed household income distribution and pov-
erty module was added in Azis (2009).11 In the current version of the model, we 
delineate different types of capital inflows, distinguishing inflows that generate 
returns on financial assets directly from those of the foreign direct investment 
(FDI) type. How each of these flows enters the balance sheet of different agents 
and transmits to the rest of the economy is captured explicitly in the model (see 
again the flowchart in Fig. 5.2). The channel connecting financial flows and 
income distribution is specified in detail by dissecting the flows as they appear on 
agents’ balance sheets, based on the type of income generated. Scrutinizing the 
role and detailed transmission within the financial sector allows us to analyze the 
dynamics of income earned from returns on financial assets held mostly by urban-
based rich households.12 On the banking side, the model also incorporates a credit 
channel component that includes the financial structure of lenders and borrowers 
in determining a bank’s willingness to lend, and the amplified effect due to 
 currency appreciation.
To simulate the model, we use Indonesia’s Financial Social Accounting Matrix 
(FSAM) and more detailed capital flow data. Most parameters are calibrated on 
10
 Aside from income inequality, poverty and unemployment are two other social indicators 
endogenously determined in the model. While unemployment is derived from the difference 
between labor demand and fixed labor supply, the aggregate variables in the real sector (total 
output (X), domestic demand (D), exports (E), imports (M), and total supply (Q)) are all deter-
mined along with their respective prices (PX, PD, PE, PM, and PQ). It is PQ that sets the overall 
price index. The poverty line (PL) can be derived from this. When PL is matched with the endog-
enously determined household income, the poverty level can be estimated.
11
 During its evolution, the model was applied to the dynamics of manufacturing sector in Azis 
(2000). It was then used to look at the impact of financial crisis on socioeconomic conditions 
in Azis (2003). Since then, the monetary block has been much improved and the model used to 
explain the disconnect between financial and real sector in Azis (2004). A more detailed break-
down of debt was made in Azis (2008), where debt maturity and debt reprofiling were specified 
based on this model version to analyze the debt sustainability issue.
12
 Due to space constraint, the detailed explanations of the model and simulation results are not 
shown (they are available upon request).
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the actual data using the (nonlinear) model specifications, while others are econo-
metrically estimated. The validity and the predictive power of the model are tested 
by plotting actual data on some exogenous variables.
The shock imposed on the model is capital flows intermediated through the 
banking sector (bank-led flows). In Chaps. 2 and 4, these flows are shown to domi-
nate capital flows during phase one of global liquidity. For our purpose here, two 
scenarios are constructed: one where recipient banks increase risk by investing 
in financial assets, particularly securities and equity markets (labeled “Risky” in 
Fig. 5.3a–c), and the other where recipient banks spend the additional funds more 
prudently, by using them to strengthen more liquid and safe assets (“Nonrisky”).
Fig. 5.3  a Impact of 
increased bank-led flows on 
aggregate demand. RGDP 
real gross domestic product. 
b Impact of increased 
bank-led flows on the 
exchange rate. c Impact of 
increased bank-led flows 
on prices, interest rates, and 
unemployment rate. Source 
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In the first scenario, real GDP is only slightly above the baseline. So are investment 
and consumption. Given the augmented liquidity due to increased capital inflows, 
inflation and unemployment rates are lower. However, the trade sector suffers: Exports 
decrease and imports increase due to currency appreciation (Fig. 5.3a–c). Looking 
more closely, appreciation derives from higher interest rates, their level influenced by 
returns on financial assets. Because the issuance of financial assets increases under 
this scenario, prices will fall and yields rise, with interest rates also increasing. In the 
search for higher returns and yields, banks actively invest in these new assets instead 
of issuing more credit. This explains why the economy grows only slightly.
The effect on income distribution—whether measured by the disparity between 
rich and poor, or in terms of the rural/urban gap—is far more obvious. As shown 
in Fig. 5.4a, b, the inequality gets worse. Although the poverty line drops 1.2 % 
below the baseline, incomes for all household categories fall, despite growing 
GDP. Two factors are behind this: (i) Wages fall due to lower prices, and (ii) eco-
nomic growth is mostly driven by activities related to the expanding financial sec-
tor. These tend to benefit only urban-rich households who depend far less on wages 
(factor income) than the rural-based poor. With more access to financial markets, 
the urban-rich accrue extra income from returns on the financial assets they hold. 
This is why increased bank-led flows under the risky behavior scenario worsen 
income inequality. And as expected, the least change is in financial income.
Fig. 5.4  a Impact of 
increased bank-led flows on 
poor/rich income ratio.  
b Impact of increased 
bank-led flows on rural/urban 









































In the “nonrisky” scenario, banks are assumed to behave prudently by extend-
ing more loans to productive sectors like manufacturing. As expected, the resulting 
real GDP is larger than under the “risky” scenario. The growth in investment and 
consumption is higher because of lower interest rates, and exports are also higher 
due to nominal and real exchange rate depreciation (see Fig. 5.3a, b). The unem-
ployment rate is also much lower, though the price index is higher (see Fig. 5.3c). 
Thus, the macroeconomic impact is better when banks behave prudently.
Incomes of all household categories increase under this scenario. This is unlike 
in the previous “risky” scenario. As increased liquidity from bank-led flows is 
largely spent on loans to the real sector—not financial assets—output and hence 
factor incomes are higher. More importantly, from the income distribution per-
spective, the urban rich do not receive extra income from these assets. As a result, 
the overall income inequality narrows between rich and poor and between rural 
and urban households (see Fig. 5.4a, b).
Thus, the effect of increased bank-led flows on income distribution is clearly 
dependent on how a bank behaves. It is abundantly clear from the model simula-
tion that the repercussions of increased bank-led flows depend on how banks react. 
The outcome is more favorable when banks act more prudently and do not take 
on increased risk. The problem is that there is no guarantee banks will behave that 
way. The discussions in Chaps. 2 and 4 clearly indicate that increased bank-led 
flows have been followed by increased bank investments in risky financial assets. 
Most financial institutions on the receiving end of capital inflows tend to take on 
more risk. As shown by the results of the model simulation, the aggregate demand 
and macroeconomic impact and the resulting income inequality are unfavorable. 
This suggests that particular measures are needed to influence the incentive–disin-
centive system for banks to act more prudently.
This is what macroprudential policy is expected to do. But the role of macropru-
dential policy is more than just reducing the risk of financial instability as discussed 
in Chap. 3. Its role in affecting socioeconomic development should also be assessed. 
Given such multiple objectives (stability in macrofinancial, microfinancial, and socioec-
onomic issues) and a whole range of policy options, which policy should be prioritized?
5.3  Prioritization for a Multi-objective Goal
In safeguarding the economy from the potential risks of bank-led flows, most 
emerging market economies refocused their policy on the asset and liability side 
of bank balance sheets.13 This is a national policy taken unilaterally by each econ-
omy. But is this sufficient and effective enough to avoid the risk of the procyclical-
ity discussed in previous chapters?
13
 On the asset side, aside from reducing loan-to-value ratios, efforts are made to contain exces-
sive credit expansion and other risky investments. On the liability side, mitigating the increase of 
noncore liabilities through bank-led flows is critical because they can heighten risky bank behav-
ior and increase leverage. See Azis and Shin (2013) and Forbes and Warnock (2012).
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Given the sheer size of capital flows, would efforts to throw “some sand in the 
well-greased wheels of international finance” help reduce the potential risks of 
financial instability by limiting the risky behavior of economic agents? We have 
argued throughout that some sort of capital controls can help—in the form of direct 
quantitative controls such as imposing a macroprudential levy on bank-led flows 
(the role of such a levy as macroprudential policy and its application are discussed 
in the next chapter). But macroprudential policies at the national level may be inad-
equate to deal with large and volatile capital flows. Regional safety nets and coop-
eration can be a useful supplement, in particular to minimize the possibility and 
impact of financial spillovers and contagion.14
Because inflows and outflows are possible in an open capital account system, 
shouldn’t we focus on how to balance outflows with inflows to limit the possibility 
of a crisis? Theoretically, capital outflows can be matched by retrenchment—
returning foreign assets owned by domestic investors. But that works only if there 
are enough foreign assets. The size of these assets can only rise if capital outflows 
are encouraged before retrenchment is needed. This occurred, for example, in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) when inflation began to rise in the mid-2000s. 
Since then, large capital inflows—especially FDI—and the increase in PRC sur-
plus put strong pressure on the renminbi, forcing a roughly 6 % annual apprecia-
tion. In response, the central bank began to encourage capital outflows by the 
private sector and the newly established PRC Investment Corporation (CIC).15 As 
a result, capital outflows from the PRC have indeed increased with low volatility 
(Fig. 5.5). While outflows from the Eurozone, the US, and Japan fell sharply dur-
ing the global financial crisis, outflows from the PRC decreased only slightly. One 
of the reasons for the relative stability is the policy-driven nature of outflows, 
unlike the case of private flows, which almost exclusively search for better risk–
return. More recently, however, non-CIC outflows increased significantly 
(Azis 2013).16 Although detailed information on the breakdown of outflows is 
scarce, data from the balance of payments are suggestive. The share of equity and 
debt outflows by PRC residents and state-owned enterprises have surged along 
with bank lending abroad.17 The resulting accumulation of net foreign assets fell 
14
 For the status of Asia’s regional financial safety nets, see Azis (2012).
15
 CIC is the second largest PRC investor overseas, ranking only behind the arm of the central 
bank that manages the economy’s foreign exchange reserves. Attempts were also made by the 
central bank to share the burden with commercial banks by raising the required reserves in both 
local currency (sharing the burden of sterilization) and foreign currency (sharing the burden of 
intervention).
16
 As an example, in 2012 the PRC government approved a pilot program in Wenzhou, Zhejiang 
province, to allow city residents to privately invest overseas. Data on cross-border flows also 
show capital outflows to bond markets in other Asian economies—especially the Republic of 
Korea—has been rising.
17
 One estimate suggests resident lending abroad rose to $270 billion in 2012, double the 
amount in 2011. But the overall rise in overseas assets is due to investment by PRC financial 
institutions (IIF 2013).
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since mid-2011 (Fig. 5.6). By 2012, reserve accumulation declined to $85 billion 
(compared to $300 billion in 2011).
In prioritizing policy, therefore, three options are considered: (i) promote direct 
investment abroad, labeled “Encourage Outflows”; (ii) “Assign Levy” to noncore 
bank liabilities; and (iii) strengthen regional financial safety nets, “Reg Safety 
Nets.” In Fig. 5.7, these three appear at the bottom of the hierarchy in each box 
that capture each component to consider. The logic of regional financial safety 
nets is to support domestic safety nets—as these remain far too inadequate—given 
the potential damage the unprecedented size and volatility of capital flows could 
Fig. 5.5  Eurozone, Japan, United States (US), and People’s Republic of China total outflows 
($ billion). Source Institute of International Finance
Fig. 5.6  Intervention and sterilization (CNY billion). Source Institute of International Finance
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cause. The rationale for assigning a levy is to restrain rather than stop capital flows 
(see again the discussions in the previous chapters). Encouraging capital outflows 
helps maintain the stability of net flows. When capital tends to flow out in a cri-
sis, during the boom-and-bust cycle, assets held abroad by domestic investors can 
act as a safeguard. They can provide a foreign asset buffer when markets become 
volatile. Indeed, the size of these ready-to-use foreign assets was important in 
some emerging market economies during the global financial crisis, the Republic 
of Korea being one example (Jain-Chandra et al. 2013).
So which policy works best? How do we prioritize the objectives, criteria, and 
the three policy options? Here, we use the analytic network process (ANP) to 
structure the model and quantify the weight of each model element (Fig. 5.7).18
18
 The figure is a slight modification of that in Azis (2014) and Min (2014), but the analysis fol-



















































































































































Fig. 5.7  Analytic network process (ANP) structure for policy options. Source Modified from 
Azis (2014) and Min (2014)
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The strategic comparative goal is to achieve a balanced outcome of 
MACROSTABILITY, MICROSTABILITY, and FINANCIAL STABILITY 
and improved SOCIOECONOMIC OBJECTIVES, depicted at the top of 
Fig. 5.7. Each policy is weighted in terms of its relevance and contribution to 
BENEFIT, OPPORTUNITY, COST, and RISK (BOCR) that can be generated 
by increased bank-led flows. In the BENEFIT cluster, two sets of components 
are considered: (i) strengthen LIQUIDITY (the first box on the left of Fig. 5.7), 
through enhanced short-term securities and equity markets, along with boosted 
financial income, and (ii) allow investment, consumption, financial income, 
and imported intermediate inputs to EXPAND (the second box on the left of 
Fig. 5.7). Some beneficial impacts of increased bank-led flows, such as improved 
CAPITAL MARKET, and enhanced RESILIENCE may emerge only in the 
long run. Hence, they are listed under OPPORTUNITY cluster. Recipient coun-
tries can also improve overall WELFARE, after a certain period, if they take 
advantage and make good use of the increased capital inflows. The components 
connecting the GOAL and policies in Fig. 5.7 are most relevant and should be 
considered in prioritizing policies. For example, given an increase in bank-led 
flows, improvements in WELFARE can be fueled by a gradual increase in the 
financial income originating in short-term securities and equity earnings.
On the downside of bank-led flows, the short- and long-term costs (COST 
and RISK, respectively) are analyzed similarly, except that the priority ranking 
is based on “Which policy is most costly or risky?” when the following compo-
nents are considered: COMPETITIVENESS and INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
under the COST cluster, and VOLATILITY, DEFLATION, and BANK 
VULNERABILITY under the RISK cluster. It is important to note that the refer-
ence for analyzing RISK is reversal of capital flows—as in many crisis episodes 
with a boom-and-bust cycle, the biggest risk in massive capital inflows is precisely 
that they can quickly reverse (procyclicality). However, one needs to distinguish 
this reversal from normal outflows from domestic investors. While useful in times 
of crisis—which is why one policy option is to encourage them—a capital flow 
reversal from investors pulling out will generate damaging capital “flight” (see 
again the distinction between capital “flight” and “retrenchment” discussed in 
Chap. 2).
The policies at the bottom of the network in Fig. 5.7 are weighted with respect 
to each component and subcomponent listed above them. For example, under 
BANK VULNERABILITY in the RISK cluster—where bank capital may dete-
riorate during a flow reversal—there is a risk that a bank’s capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR) will deteriorate. The relevant question then is which of the three policies 
will likely create this risk (most risky)?
All arrows under each component in Fig. 5.7 point in two directions, implying 
a feedback effect for each influence from an element to the other elements below 
it. Thus, the structure in each box under each cluster forms a network. Taking 
the example of BANK VULNERABILITY in the RISK cluster again, a typical 
question is—“which risk is least likely to be resolved given a selected policy?” 
Applying pairwise comparisons, priority rankings for each feedback were made. 
5.3 Prioritization for a Multi-objective Goal
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The inputs used are a combination of the normalized quantitative data derived 
from the FCGE model simulations and analytical perceptions. The rankings based 
on the complex network structure are derived from the limiting super-matrix (see 
Appendix).
Table 5.1 shows the results of priority rankings for the three policies under the 
BOCR.19 Thus, while to “Encourage Outflows” ranks highest in terms of its capac-
ity to generate BENEFIT and OPPORTUNITY, the policy is also considered most 
costly and risky. For example, compared with “Assign Levy” and “Reg Safety 
Nets,” “Encourage Outflows” will do the least in avoiding decreased competitive-
ness caused by the appreciation of real exchange rate (RER). On the RISK side, 
capital flow reversals may cause VOLATILITY in the EQUITY market. To 
“Encourage Outflows” will obviously make things worse.
19
 For example, under the BENEFIT scenario in Table 5.1, three eigenvectors are shown 
(“Ideals,” “Normals,” and “Raw”). While all three give the same ranking—encourage outflows 
being most preferred, followed by assigning levies, and regional financial safety nets (hence the 
ranking shown in the last column of Table 5.1)—the normalized eigenvector (0.4381; 0.4358; 
and 0.1261) under “Normal” with the sum equaling unity is the most often used. All numbers 
under the column “Benefit,” “Opportunity,” “Cost,” and “Risk” in Table 5.2 show the normalized 
eigenvector.
Table 5.1  ANP results for benefit (B), opportunity (O), cost (C), and risk (R)
Source Results of ANP
Ideals Normals Raw Ranking
Benefit
1. Encourage outflows 1 0.438129 0.858812 1
2. Assigning levies 0.994591 0.435759 0.854167 2
3. Reg safety nets 0.287844 0.126113 0.247204 3
Opportunity
1. Encourage outflows 1 0.477338 0.826065 1
2. Assigning levies 0.712725 0.340211 0.588757 2
3. Reg safety nets 0.382225 0.182451 0.315742 3
Cost
1. Encourage outflows 1 0.725513 1 1
2. Assigning levies 0.08878 0.064411 0.08878 3
3. Reg safety nets 0.289555 0.210076 0.289555 2
Risk
1. Encourage outflows 1 0.488161 0.983803 1
2. Assigning levies 0.313358 0.152969 0.308283 3
3. Reg safety nets 0.735147 0.35887 0.72324 2



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































96 5 Capital Flows and Income Distribution
Having calculated these priorities, the next step is to apply them to some BOCR 
formula. Two types are used here: (i) the multiplicative approach (B*O)/(C*R) and 
(ii) the additive approach (bB + oO − cC − rR).20
Table 5.2 lists the results. The upper panel equally ranks BOCR, with the last 
column showing the superiority of “Assign Levy.” The middle and lower pan-
els display the results of sensitivity analyses; the middle reflects a more subdued 
option, where COST and RISK clusters are weighted more than BENEFIT and 
OPPORTUNITY—the reverse case is shown in the bottom panel, representing 
a “buoyant” scenario. In either case, the highest preference for “Assign Levy” 
remains. Only the ranking of the other two policies is reversed when an additive 
approach is used. This suggests the superiority of placing a levy on bank-led flows 
is robust.
The policy analysis therefore suggests that during tranquil periods, capital out-
flows should be encouraged to help stabilize net flows in times of market turmoil. 
At the same time, this strengthens competitiveness as the exchange rate weak-
ens. However, after considering both costs and risks, imposing a levy on bank-led 
flows works better. The resulting stable financial market feeds into the real econ-
omy, boosting factor income rather than returns on financial assets. This suggests 
it will also reduce inequality. Through sensitivity tests, the result is found to be 
robust. Clearly, taking a one-sided approach in evaluating policy alternatives—by 
neglecting the potential costs and risks of these policies—may produce a subopti-
mal result.
5.4 Appendix
The presence of feedback influences in a network model requires a large 
matrix—known as a super-matrix—that contains a set of submatrixes. The 
super-matrix captures the influence of elements in a network on other elements 
in that network. Denoting a cluster by Ch, h = 1, … m, and assuming that it has 
nh elements eh1, eh2, eh3 …, ehmh, and laying out all clusters and all elements in 
each cluster both vertically (on the left) and horizontally (at the top), we have 
the super-matrix in Fig. 5.8.
The typical entry of this super-matrix is in Fig. 5.9.
The entries of submatrixes in Wij are the ratio scales derived from paired 
comparisons performed on the elements within the clusters themselves, 
20
 For the rationale of both, see Saaty and Vargas (2006).
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according to their influence on each element in another cluster (outer depend-
ence) or elements in their own cluster (inner dependence). Judgments are 
elicited, from which ratio scales are derived. The resulting unweighted super-
matrix is then transformed into a matrix where each column sums to unity to 
generate a stochastic super-matrix. The derived weights are used to weight the 
elements of the corresponding column blocks (cluster) of the super-matrix, 
resulting in a weighted super-matrix, which is also stochastic. The final rank-
ing is derived from the limiting super-matrix, obtained by raising the stochastic 
super-matrix to large powers, in order to read off final priorities, in which all 
matrix columns are identical. Each gives the relative priorities of the elements 
from which the priorities of the elements in each cluster are normalized to one 
(the powers of the super-matrix do not converge unless it is stochastic, ensuring 
that its largest eigenvalue is one). Using the example of the EXPAND compo-
nent under the BENEFIT cluster in Fig. 5.7, the resulting limiting super-matrix 
is displayed in Table 5.3.
Fig. 5.8  Super-matrix of a 
network
Fig. 5.9  Entries in super-
matrix of a network
5.4  Appendix
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